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Introduction
From birth control and abortion to in vitro fertilization and ge-
netic enhancement, reproductive technologies are furnishing Ameri-
cans not only with new modes of control over sexual and reproductive
choice, but also with new sites for cultural conflict. The flare-up over
the HPV vaccine provides a recent and typical example, with adversa-
ries quickly and intuitively taking up sides in the debate.'
The conventional representation of this conflict focuses on partic-
ular constituencies: the feminist community's embrace of women's
right to maximize their reproductive options and Christian conserva-
tives' claims of Biblical prohibition against some of those same
* This research was made possible in part by grants from the National Science Founda-
tion's Decision, Risk and Management Sciences Program (Awards No. 0621840 and 0318513).
Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those
of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Foundation.
1 See, e.g., Lawrence K. Altman, Doctors Support a Childhood Vaccine for a Sex-Related
Virus, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 2005, at A13.
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choices. Kristin Luker's Abortion and the Politics of Motherhood is a
cornerstone in this argument, and it firmly established the feminist-
Christian nexus as the key to understanding societal conflict over re-
productive technology in the United States. 2 Other works have fol-
lowed in a similar vein, identifying particular social groups as framing
or exploiting reproductive technology choices for their own rhetorical
or moral purposes.3 This account-call it the traditional account-is
one of open cultural combat between individuals with competing vi-
sions of the good society.
It is a good story, and there is undoubtedly a lot of truth to it;
however, it is also missing something crucial. Alongside the explicit
and conscious conflict over values is a subtler and more tenacious
form of conflict, one that occurs without the participants even being
aware of it. It is a conflict that emerges at the implicit level of cogni-
tion and serves to support and exacerbate the explicit considerations
of competing values and moral worth. This subtler form of conflict is
a product of what we call cultural cognition, a set of social and psycho-
logical processes that underwrite divergent factual beliefs on matters
that implicate our diverse and often divergent values and cultural
commitments. From gun control and pornography to nuclear power
and global warming, cultural cognition pushes us to view the physical
world of material consequence as consistent with our moral visions of
the good society. Cultural cognition helps to explain not only why we
believe that our preferred laws and policies are right and just, but also
why they are good for the health and welfare of our fellow citizens.
This approach complicates how we think about what our conflicts
are about and how to seek common ground. In a pluralistic society
there is constant pressure to put aside sectarian values and to focus on
neutral arguments about welfare based on the facts as we know them.
The debate over the HPV vaccine-to take one example from the do-
main of reproductive technology-is not just a debate over whether it
is morally acceptable to administer a vaccine to a child, but also over
whether the vaccine will, all things considered, have positive or nega-
tive effects on the health and welfare on those who are vaccinated.
4
2 See generally KRISTIN LUKER, ABORTION AND THE POLITICS OF MOTHERHOOD (1985)
(providing a history of the issues framing the abortion debate, its current status, and the future
of the debate).
3 See, e.g., GENE BURNS, THE MORAl. VETO: FRAMING CONTRACEPTION, ABORTION,
AND CULTURAL PLURALISM IN THE UNITED STATES 2-4 (2005) (explaining that historically peo-
ple have framed contraception and abortion issues differently depending on shifting social and
political views).
4 See Altman, supra note 1.
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Indeed, to the main participants in this debate, the welfare of those
being vaccinated is what they care about most. This welfarist turn in
the debate does not lead to convergence, however, because the phe-
nomenon of cultural cognition leads the parties to strongly contrasting
views of what the welfare effects of the vaccine are-views that are
tightly correlated with their core cultural commitments and values. 5
So even when individuals attempt to put their potentially illiberal sec-
tarian values to the side and have a respectful debate over shared and
supposedly neutral welfare concerns, they end up disagreeing just as
vehemently.
6
Because cultural cognition can-and often does-result in this
kind of cognitive illiberalism, those who believe that welfarist consid-
erations have an important role to play in the debate over reproduc-
tive technologies stand to benefit from an investigation into cultural
cognition's effects on the debate. Understanding how cultural cogni-
tion has shaped and is likely to shape public reactions to emerging
reproductive technologies can help those who are engaged in these
policy discussions guard against the pull of cognitive illiberalism and
help them clear effective paths to common ground that might other-
wise have eluded them. Beginning that process is the goal of this
Article.
We proceed in three parts. Part I introduces the key concepts
and propositions in the cultural theory of mass opinion that we deploy
in this analysis. Part II explores the cultural character of debates over
reproductive technology. We explore theoretical relationships be-
tween cultural orientations and key aspects of reproductive technol-
ogy conflicts, such as how different cultural worldviews approach
science, innovation, religion, and women's rights. To look at a specific
case, we consider how arguments on genetic enhancement resonate
with different cultural values, and we juxtapose these findings with a
map of where the American public stands in general on cultural value
questions. Part III adds a conception of public deliberation to the
analysis and considers theoretical relationships between the features
of deliberation and cultural orientations. Finally, Part IV brings this
discussion back to the context of reproductive technology to consider
briefly the potential for deliberative politics on these issues.
5 See Dan M. Kahan et al., The Second National Risk and Culture Study: Making Sense
of-and Making Progress in-the American Culture War of Fact 10-13 (Yale Law Sch. Pub. Law
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L A Cultural Theory of Mass Opinion
The starting point for our cultural approach is the pioneering
work of Mary Douglas and political scientist Aaron Wildavsky.
7
Douglas and Wildavsky believed that individuals viewed risks through
the lens of culture. 8 They argued that competing visions of the good
society not only motivated people to make claims about which social
arrangements they preferred, but also oriented them to the facts about
which activities were dangerous and which were benign-at least inso-
far as these facts related to their commitments to competing visions of
the good society.9 The authors seized on two orienting sets of values
that they believed would be particularly powerful, values that can be
expressed as polar dimensions. One dimension distinguishes a more
individualistic worldview from its collectivist counterpart, 10 while the
other distinguishes an egalitarian worldview from one that emphasizes
the importance of traditional social, political, and economic
hierarchies. I
A host of studies have since confirmed both Douglas and Wildav-
sky's general insights and the specific power of these two orienting
values across a wide array of risk and policy concerns. 12 For example,
the 2004 National Risk and Culture Survey of a random sample of
1,800 American households found survey measures of cultural orien-
tation to be powerful predictors of a range of risk perceptions and
7 On cultural theory, see generally MICHAEL THOMPSON, RICHARD ELLIS & AARON
WILDAVSKY, CULTURAL THEORY (1990); MARY DOUGLAS & AARON WILDAVSKY, RISK AND
CULTURE: AN ESSAY ON THE SELECTION OF TECHNICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL DANGERS
(1982); and Aaron Wildavsky, Choosing Preferences by Constructing Institutions: A Cultural The-
ory of Preference Formation, 81 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 3 (1987). There is a large empirical and
theoretical body of work on risk perception that builds on thctc theories. Representative studies
include Dan M. Kahan et al., Culture and Identity-Protective Cognition: Explaining the White
Male Effect in Risk Perception, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 465, 472-91 (2007); Karl Dake,
Orienting Dispositions in the Perception of Risk: An Analysis of Contemporary Worldviews and
Cultural Biases, 22 J. CROSS-CULTURAL PSYCHOL. 61, 61 (1991); Ellen Peters & Paul Slovic, The
Role of Affect and Worldviews as Orienting Dispositions in the Perception and Acceptance of
Nuclear Power, 26 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1427, 1427 (1996); and Linda Steg & Inge Sievers,
Cultural Theory and Individual Perceptions of Environmental Risks, 32 ENV'T & BEHAV. 250,
250 (2000).
8 See DOUGLAS & WILDAVSKY, supra note 7, at 7-11. This presentation is an adaptation
of the original theory, stressing the attitudinal component of cultural theory and replacing the
grid/group pairing with the closely related four-orientation approach.
9 See id. at 9.
10 The collectivist worldview is alternatively referred to as a "solidarist" worldview, which
we treat as a synonym.
11 See DOUGLAS & WILDAVSKY, supra note 7, at 97-101.
12 See supra note 7.
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policy perceptions.13 This survey also confirmed that culture was a
more powerful predictor than either demographics, e.g., region,
ethnicity, sex, or political orientations (partisanship, left-right ideol-
ogy); in many cases, the cultural account sapped all of these predictors
of their explanatory power.1 4 Moreover, these orienting values
proved a powerful predictor of attitudes even at low levels of political
knowledge, whereas people only at the higher levels of political
knowledge were attuned to the more partisan cues in their informa-
tion environments.
15
A subsequent series of national survey experiments conducted in
2006 and 2007 has replicated these results and provided additional in-
sight into the cognitive mechanisms underlying culture's effect on
opinions. 16 In particular, these studies confirmed that people can
readily recognize the cultural orientations of message senders (speak-
ers, authors, etc.) and the cultural cues embedded in ostensibly neutral
messages.' 7 The more culturally resonant a message and its sender,
the more likely one is to credit the information or adopt the position
advocated in the communication.' 8 This cognitive cueing process hap-
pens relatively quickly and does not require high levels of political
knowledge or a special kind of cultural sophistication.' 9
At the heart of the model is what can be described as one's cul-
tural orientation, which includes one's values, as well as complemen-
tary characteristics, such as patterns of social relations and ways of
speaking. Demographics are often viewed as proxies for cultural ori-
entation, and many studies of mass opinion implicitly assume (though
rarely articulate) this assumption. On this account, race, ethnicity, re-
gion, community, and various conceptions of ideology can be treated
as common but imperfect proxies for this richer conception of cultural
orientation. Though culture is sometimes reduced to one's demo-
graphic characteristics, such as when sociolinguist Deborah Tannen re-
13 See Kahan et al., supra note 7, at 472-91; Dan M. Kahan et al., Fear of Democracy: A
Cultural Evaluation of Sunstein on Risk, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1071, 1086-87 (2006); John Gastil et
al., The "Wildavsky Heuristic": The Cultural Orientation of Mass Political Opinion 12-21 (Yale
Law Sch. Pub. Law Working Paper Group, Paper No. 107, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=834264; see also The Cultural Cognition Project at Yale Law School, http://research.
yale.edu/culturalcognition (last visited July 17, 2008).
14 See Gastil et al., supra note 13, at 21-22.
15 See Kahan et al., supra note 13, at 492-93.
16 See generally Kahan et al., supra note 5.
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fers to women and men as existing in two separate linguistic cultures,20
we conceptualize demographics as affecting the relative social promi-
nence or acceptability of different cultural identities. On this account,
one's cultural orientation is influenced but not determined by the
character of one's family, community, or geographic region of origin,
and one's biological sex, ethnicity, and socioeconomic status can also
combine to make a given cultural mode more or less available to any
individual. For the purposes of the present discussion, though, the ori-
gins of one's cultural orientation are far less important than its conse-
quences for attitude formation and deliberation.
Among the various common expressions of one's cultural orien-
tation are political partisanship and the liberal-conservative self-iden-
tification. As conceptualized herein, partisanship is one's willingness
to be associated with a particular political party, as well as the fre-
quency with which one affiliates with that party. For most citizens,
active partisanship is limited to registration in a party's name and vot-
ing for its candidates, though many voters live in states where even
party registration and primary ballot selection do not require party
identification. Nonetheless, it is important to recognize that partisan
identity is all at once a cognitive self-labeling (thinking of oneself as a
Republican), a verbal self-expression (saying to a surveyor or a fellow
citizen, "I am a Republican"), and a pattern of social association
(seeking the company of self-described Republicans). As we concep-
tualize these variables, they are more a reflection of one's cultural ori-
entation-a means of expression and a mode of association-than an
independent force in explaining attitudes.
Because the cultural orientation of individuals is shaped by
demographics and underwrites conventional political and ideological
expressions, the structure of cultural cognition's influence on mass
opinion and public deliberation shares much in common with conven-
tional theories of public opinion and persuasion. We incorporate fa-
miliar concepts, such as selective attention to information, 21 message
framing,z2 filtering,23 and heuristics. 24 Each of these processes can be
traced along the bottom of Figure 1, from the pool of available infor-
20 See DEBORAH TANNEN, GENDER AND DISCOURSE 19-21 (1994).
21 See Diana C. Mutz & Paul S. Martin, Facilitating Communication Across Lines of Politi-
cal Difference: The Role of Mass Media, 95 Am. POL. ScL. REV. 97, 98-99 (2001).
22 See Robert M. Entman, Framing: Toward Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm, 43 J.
COMM. 51, 51-55 (1993) (discussing the concept of frames and how they operate).
23 See generally ALICE H. EAGLY & SHELLY CHAIKEN, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ATTITUDES
281-97 (1993).
24 See generally ARTHUR LUPIA & MATHEW D. MCCUBBINS, THE DEMOCRATIC DI-
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mation all the way to the expression of a policy attitude. Along the
way, culture plays a pivotal role in shaping attitudes, with additional
influences provided by political expertise and partisan identity.
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The path to attitude formation and expression begins with the
pool of information and symbolic associations available. In a typical
account of this process, the greatest emphasis is given to the messages
conveyed through the mass media,25 but it is also important to include
social interaction and conversation as sources of information. 26 More
important still is the inclusion of the omnipresent cultural symbols and
signals that flood our social worlds. Compared to the transmission
and reception of political information, cultural symbols and cues re-
quire relatively little effort on the part of the senders and receivers.
27
The relative ease with which cultural knowledge flows has important
implications for attitude formation beyond mere exposure level, but
that is its first influence. Whereas political sophistication is an impor-
tant positive influence on the amount of political information a person
LEMMA: CAN CITIZENS LEARN WHAT THEY NEED TO KNow? (1998); see also EAGLY &
CHAIKEN, supra note 23, at 326-31, 342-45.
25 See Mutz & Martin, supra note 21, at 98-99.
26 See generally ROBERT HUCKFELDT ET AL., POLITICAL DISAGREEMENT: THE SURVIVAL
oF DIVERSE OPINIONS WITHIN COMMUNICATION NETWORKS (2004) (describing the importance
of disagreement in democratic politics).
27 See Wildavsky, supra note 7, at 8.
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receives28 and retains, 29 it is unlikely that political sophistication has a
substantial effect on the amount of cultural information received rele-
vant to a given policy domain.
Another influence on the informational and symbolic inputs in a
person's communicative diet is a selection bias. It has often been as-
sumed that people select information sources consistent with their
preexisting views, and this finding has been widely reported with re-
gard to media use.30 Recent research has found, however, that a selec-
tion bias is even more common in choosing interpersonal conversation
partners than in selecting news media. 31 Political selectivity, however,
is typically conditional on a modicum of political expertise, 32 whereas
the cultural selection of symbols, information sources, and associa-
tions has happened since time immemorial.33 All it requires is "social
interaction among adherents of a particular culture in contrast to
other cultures whose identifiers have different preferences. ' '34 Thus,
we naturally self-select ourselves into culturally similar groups and ar-
rangements, and we select culturally reinforcing media, from maga-
zine subscriptions to movie rentals.
In addition to the information and associations a person ulti-
mately encounters, culture (and, to a lesser extent, partisanship) sifts
and filters these inputs to arrive at an attitude (or set of salient consid-
erations) and a preferred language for expressing one's views. The
first process listed in Figure I is effortful deliberation on the merits of
a policy in relation to one's core values,35 a relatively special process
we discuss in more detail later. The more typical process for translat-
ing information and associations into opinion is the automatic deploy-
ment of cognitive filtering heuristic reasoning mechanisms. People
use cultural signals and cues to recognize a culturally like-minded in-
28 See Vincent Price & John Zaller, Who Gets the News? Alternative Measures of News
Reception and Their Implications for Research, 57 PUB. OPINION Q. 133, 157-58 (1993).
29 See June Woong Rhee & Joseph N. Cappella, The Role of Political Sophistication in
Learning from News: Measuring Schema Development, 24 COMM. RES. 197, 228 (1997).
30 See, e.g., PEW RESEARCH CTR. FOR THE PEOPLE & THE PRESS, MEDIA CONSUMPTION
AND BELIEVABILITY STUDY 1-4 (2004), http://people-press.org/reports/pdf/215.pdf (discussing
the political polarization reflected in the public's news viewing habits). See generally JOHN R.
ZALLER, THE NATURE AND ORIGINS OF MASS OPINION (1992).
31 See Mutz & Martin, supra note 21, at 98.
32 See ZALLER, supra note 30, at 21-22.
33 See Wildavsky, supra note 7, at 8-9.
34 Id. at 9.
35 For a more in-depth treatment of this process and a definition, see generally Stephanie
Burkhalter et al., A Conceptual Definition and Theoretical Model of Public Deliberation in Small
Face-to-Face Groups, 12 COMM. THEORY 1 (2002).
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formation source, a culturally similar manner of speech, or even a cul-
turally resonant style of dress, tone of voice, or demographic profile.
All of these "peripheral cues" are readily available, as they are funda-
mental to one's cultural orientation-which, once again, is more than
just one's core beliefs, but also one's way of talking and living. All
that is required for cueing is that a given informational or symbolic
input resonates with one's cultural orientation. The process requires
no special expertise, and given the volume of input one receives in the
course of everyday life, cultural resonance is a relatively strong predic-
tor of one's attitudes, even on public issues that do not appear to be
innately "cultural" in character, such as those involving technology or
medicine.
The final heuristic process is the "availability heuristic," which re-
fers to the fact that attitude reports are shaped by "the ease with
which instances or associations could be brought to mind. ' 36 For pub-
lic opinion scholar John Zaller, this translates into an "Accessibility
Axiom," which holds that "the more recently a consideration had
been called to mind," the more readily it comes into consideration
when one is asked to express an attitude.
37
The end result of these selecting, cueing, and filtering processes is
both a set of policy-relevant considerations and a set of related lin-
guistic preferences. This final point requires a modest shift in how
one thinks about attitudes, as commonly measured. Zaller crystallized
the notion that measurable "attitudes" are really just averages of the
salient and accessible considerations that come into one's mind when
responding to a question.3 8 We share this view, but also add that the
respondent is keenly alert to culturally relevant language and fram-
ings. Thus, when a person reports an attitude, they are reporting the
36 Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Availability: A Heuristic for Judging Frequency and
Probability, 5 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 207, 208 (1973).
37 ZALLER, supra note 30, at 48.
38 Id. at 49. In a weaker sense, this linguistic interpretation of survey response parallels
Zaller's observation that response sensitivity to question wording "because the public, having no
fixed true opinion, implicitly relies on the particular question it has been asked to determine
what exactly the issue is and what considerations are relevant to settling it." Id. at 95. In a
stronger sense, our view differs from Zaller in that we posit that people may lack issue-specific
attitudes, per se, while having relatively fixed cultural orientations. In this view, question word-
ing can signal not only a particular policy domain but also what cultural issue, if any, is at hand.
To the extent that a question strongly evokes culturally relevant considerations, the response is
more closely related to one's cultural orientation. Thus, an individualist might be more reactive
to an item asking about "threats to personal privacy" than one concerning "access to medical
information" because the latter phrasing uses less culturally powerful words.
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average of their considerations in response to the cultural position
taken by the question itself.
II. The Cultural Contours of Reproductive Technology Conflicts
The ongoing debates over reproductive technologies in the
United States can be characterized in culture-theoretic terms. By
looking closely at the cultural signals given by various advocates, it is
possible to map arguments and positions culturally, and then diagram
the directions of conflict in these same debates. This Part will briefly
review one major issue in the area of reproductive technology: the
debate over genetic enhancement.
A. Theoretical Positions
The cultural theory we advance does not prespecify, on theoreti-
cal grounds, what position on any given issue will be associated with a
particular orientation-those associations are specific to time and
place. How cultural orientations line up with particular public policy
proposals can be as much a result of political expediency and histori-
cal accident as a consequence of underlying cultural convictions. In
the early stages of a debate, such as the nascent conflict over genetic
enhancement, it is possible that no consensus emerges within one or
another cultural camp.
Nonetheless, in light of the social history of related cultural con-
tests in the United States, it is possible to assess likely points of con-
flict and agreement over reproductive technology. Table 1 suggests
how the main values considered can be expected to influence individ-
uals' considerations of important dimensions of reproductive technol-
ogy: the scientific community, technological innovation, the role of
religion in society, and women's rights.
Of the values, only individualism appears likely to hold generally
favorable views toward the scientific community and technological in-
novation. Each of the other cultural groups has concerns, fears, and
an abiding skepticism that has risen to the forefront in their assess-
ments of other new technologies. Even egalitarians, who welcome
technology that liberates us from class-based drudgery, have a recent
history of neo-Luddite wariness of technology further widening our
existing divisions of wealth and power and endangering species, eco-
systems, and the Earth itself.39
39 See Dov Fox, Silver Spoons and Golden Genes: Genetic Engineering and the Egalitarian
Ethos, 33 AM. J.L. & MED. 567, 573-74 (2007).
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Table 1. How Orienting
Debates
Values Shape Reproductive Technology
Cultural Orientation
Actor/Issue Hierarch Egalitarian Individualist Collectivist
Skeptical of Skeptical of Favorable view Concerns
modern corporate- of scientific about
Scientific university's funded science discovery and scientists as
Community liberal entrepreneurial- outspoken
educational ism dissenters
mission
General Fear of techno- Generally Fear that
concern dystopia favorable view new
about imperiling of new technology
Technological change, fear planet but technology, will break up
Innovation of new welcomes except when community
technology liberating used for ties and
upsetting the technology surveillance/ interdepen-
social order control dencies
Value role of Ecumenical View religion Value
traditional toward non- as private, religion's role
religions hierarchical separate from maintaining
establishing religions, state and public social






Believe sex Believe Believe women Women have
partly defines women's rights should have special
one's role in must be same freedoms responsibility
society and protected, as as all other for
Women's the course of patriarchy individuals maintaining
Rights life; often perpetually family and
holds that threatens them community
male is also bonds
head of the
household
Egalitarianism and individualism are more closely aligned on
questions of religion and liberty, both generating concerns about ties
between religion and public morality, in particular when it infringes
on personal freedom. The plainest difference is simply that individu-
alism implies no special concern for women's rights, in relation to
other personal liberties, whereas modern American egalitarianism im-
plicates worries over gender-based inequality. By contrast, collectiv-
ism and approval of traditional modes of hierarchy celebrate both the
role of religion in maintaining the social order and the special respon-
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sibility they believe women have for maintaining family and commu-
nity ties.
These differences, though, are theoretical. How actual arguments
play out in any particular debate on reproductive technology depends
on more than the potential connections between the objective features
of the issue and the principles and theoretical positions of each cul-
tural orientation. It is at this point that we turn to a specific issue and
a particular emerging debate-the public argument over the future
use of genetic enhancement.
B. Cultural Arguments on Genetic Enhancement
In the last half of the twentieth century, biomedical research has
given society a much greater understanding of the genes that control
the development of human life. With that knowledge has come the
capability to affect those genes and, in some cases, alter human devel-
opment. Prospective parents have been able to determine, for in-
stance, if their child is at risk for a potentially crippling genetic
disorder, giving them the opportunity to end a pregnancy before hav-
ing a child with an inherited disease.40 Except through this kind of
selection process, genetic science does not yet allow parents to have
"designer" children by actively manipulating the genetic makeup of
sperm, ova, or the product of the two, but such capabilities may be
possible in the near future.41
As this sort of genetic manipulation has come closer to a reality,
ethicists, scientists, and policy makers have begun to debate the merits
of such technology. The different arguments put forth in the debate
on genetic enhancement span much of the cultural typology discussed
in this Article, and we will consider each cultural perspective, in turn.
Part of what is fascinating about the debate over reproductive
technologies is that arguments that bear the signatures of individual-
ism and collectivism are deployed on both sides of the issue. Thus,
proponents of genetic enhancement argue, consistent with tenets of
individual freedom and choice, that the principles behind the technol-
ogy have been operating for centuries through individual human mate
selection and through selective breeding of crops or animals, for ex-
ample.42 Preventing or restricting the development of genetic en-
hancement technology would block the natural market-based
40 See id. at 622.
41 See id.
42 Phillip Manning, 'Frankenfood' or Godsend?, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Mar.
6, 2005, at 4G.
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development of life-saving biomedical advancements, supporters
argue.
43
Opponents of genetic enhancement, however, also deploy argu-
ments from individualism, warning that humans could become pup-
pets as their traits-and futures-are decided by genetic enhancement
prior to conception or birth, and individual choice is stripped away.44
If certain traits are promoted, and others are deleted, the argument
goes that people will eventually begin to lose their individuality and
will become accustomed to limitations on their ability to choose an
idiosyncratic and free path to their own ends. 45 Some people express
concern that people who are cloned or otherwise genetically enhanced
would essentially be mindless drones or carbon copies of each other-
a claim that other commentators, even opponents of genetic enhance-
ment, are quick to decry as a scare tactic.46 Individualists have also
worried that failure to consider modest restrictions on genetic en-
hancement may lead government entities to later impose far more se-
vere forms of control over biomedical science and industry.47
Communitarian and collectivist arguments are most commonly
used by proponents of genetic enhancement. Even if problems of in-
dividual choice are implicated by genetic enhancement, on this ac-
count, reproductive technologies will ultimately redound to the
benefit of all by helping to reduce suffering and prevent diseases.48
Other communitarian-style arguments suggest that such advances,
while perhaps initially advantaging wealthy populations who can af-
ford to exercise choice, will eventually benefit all.49 In short, they ar-
gue, the potential benefits for our collective welfare outweigh any
concerns we might raise regarding the threat to individual choice or
traditional conceptions of morality.50
Egalitarian arguments are quite common among opponents of ge-
netic enhancement. An industry providing such gene upgrades at a
cost would simply create even more division between the privileged
43 See Johann Hari, Bio-Luddites Impede Healthier Kids, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER,
July 7, 2006, at B7.
44 See, e.g., Bill McKibben, Keep Us Human: If We're Truly Smart, We'll Refuse to Fool-
ishly Tamper with Our DNA, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 14, 2003, at BlI; see also Cathy Young. Troubling
Issues in Biotechnology, BOSTON GLOBE, July 21, 2003, at A13.
45 See Young, supra note 44.
46 See id.
47 See id.
48 Editorial, A Cloning Ban: Senate Shouldn't Repeat the House's Legislative Mistake, BUF-
FALO NEWS, Mar. 10, 2003, at B6.
49 See Hari, supra note 43.
50 See id.
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and the disadvantaged, commentators argue.51 The richest people in
society would be able to improve the wellness and physical traits of
their offspring, while those lower on the socioeconomic scale would be
left without genetic improvements-susceptible to unexpected ill-
nesses, inherited maladies, and the gambles of regular life.52 Along a
similar line of reasoning, some commentators warn that genetic en-
hancement could be used to weed out below-average people from so-
ciety in general, by selecting genes to make people smarter, more
attractive, or more gregarious.
53
On the other side of the cultural scale from egalitarian argu-
ments, few arguments explicitly embrace hierarchical reasoning in ar-
guing for or against genetic enhancement. One of the few such
arguments focuses on the sporting world, where a commentator con-
tends that regulation of such technology-rather than an outright
ban-could allow genetically enhanced athletes to compete against
one another on a roughly level playing field.54 Divisions in sports al-
ready recognize the differences in innate ability between athletes, and
the regulation of genetic technology could allow enhanced athletes to
compete against one another without affecting competitions between
nonenhanced people.
55
There is, however, a very common form of argument that taps
into a traditionalist element of hierarchism, which holds that there are
natural hierarchies inherent in human society. Some of the most com-
mon arguments against genetic enhancement are that it will become a
technology gone awry, a misguided utopian effort to extend our mor-
tality.56 We could, unknowingly, make our species into a sort of
Frankenstein, a dangerous and unpredictable monster that could de-
stroy the traditional human order and our precious human nature.
57
This is not an explicit argument for protecting social hierarchies, but it
is resonant with more explicit economic arguments about the need to
accept wealth inequalities for the good of all.
51 See Caroline S. Wagner, The Weapons of Mass Creation: Are We Ready for Genetically
Enhanced 'Designer People'? If So, Who Will Make the Titanic Decisions Involved?, L.A. TIMES,
Feb. 13, 2003, at B23.
52 See id.
53 See McKibben, supra note 44.
54 Gregory M. Lamb, Will Gene-Altered Athletes Kill Sport? Soon, Animal DNA Could
Make Us Faster and Stronger-No Training Needed, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Boston, Mass.),
Aug. 23, 2004, at 12.
55 See id.
56 Nicholas D. Kristof, The Age-Old Question: Humanity Must Tread Carefully as Science
Searches for Immortality, PITrSBURGH POST-GAZETrE, Aug. 14, 2003, at A17.
57 See McKibben, supra note 44.
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C. Mapping the Cultural Landscape
There are several interesting features in the cultural landscape
around the genetic enhancement debate. Perhaps one of the most in-
teresting is what is absent: few commentators appear comfortable ex-
plicitly touting the hierarchical nature of genetic enhancement. Such
technology is based on the idea that our genetic makeup and future
development can vary widely from person to person, with some peo-
ple suffering at the hands of poor genes and others flourishing with a
stacked deck of good genes. Enhancement of genetic makeup is a way
to recognize those differences and utilize them to help make people
"better"-healthier, less susceptible to disease, and free of inherited
disabilities. Even so, proponents of genetic enhancement research are
careful to avoid the idea of "improving" humankind, focusing instead
on the benefits of increased choice, reducing suffering, and lowering
the incidence of debilitating diseases.
Without a more comprehensive inventory of advocates and argu-
ments, we cannot describe how culture maps onto the genetic en-
hancement debate with precision. With that caveat in mind, we do
recognize a couple of likely cultural clusters. Against enhancement,
there are examples of commentators who blend individualist argu-
ments against genetic technology with a concern that genetic enhance-
ment could lead to greater divisions between haves and have-nots-a
distinctly egalitarian viewpoint.58
There are also those who worry about the new technology's
threat to the social order, a concern that stretches between the hierar-
chical and collectivist poles.59 On the pro side, individualists and egal-
itarians alike recognize the potential for this technology to help
individuals realize personal aspirations or overcome disadvantages,
whereas hierarchs and collectivists see how genetic enhancement
could reinforce social hierarchies or promote collective well-being,
respectively.
Figure 2 graphically depicts these arguments in the two-dimen-
sional cultural space. Represented in this way, the issue pits the top-
right quadrant against the bottom-left. Unlike many protracted cul-
tural conflicts, however, with one corner on the pro side and its coun-
terpart on the con, there are both proponents and dissenters in each of
the rival cultural camps.
58 See Young, supra note 44.
59 See McKibben, supra note 44.
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Before considering the implications of the pattern in Figure 2, it is
useful to look at the general distribution of the U.S. public on the
cultural dimensions. Figure 3 shows the results of a 2004 telephone
survey we conducted on a national random sample of 1,600 U.S. citi-
zens.60 We asked each respondent to say the extent to which they
agreed or disagreed with culturally prototypical statements. For in-
stance, sixty percent agreed with the egalitarian sentiment, "Our soci-
ety would be better off if the distribution of wealth was more equal."
6
1
We combined these items to estimate each person's cultural orienta-
tion, and Figure 3 shows a crude scatter plot of where people fell in
two-dimensional cultural space.
For our discussion, there are two important features in this graph.
First, the overwhelming majority moderated their responses to our
cultural items, ultimately locating themselves in various quadrants but
landing nearer the middle of the chart than its extremes. Second, the
two quadrants with the greatest number of extreme data points were
the top-left and bottom-right. That is, there were relatively few peo-
ple expressing strong views blending individualism with egalitarian-
ism, on the one hand, and hierarchism and collectivism, on the other.62
60 See supra notes 13-15 and accompanying text.
61 See Gastil et al., supra note 13, at 13, 39-42.
62 Expressed as a simple correlation coefficient, the two dimensions had a significant posi-
tive correlation (r = .46, p < .001), with hierarchism and individualism positively associated.
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We discuss this distribution in greater detail in other work,63 but the
gist of our findings is that the divide shown in Figure 3 is at the heart
of American politics, encompassing (among other things) the partisan
divide between Democrats and Republicans, as well as the aforemen-
tioned split between feminism and religious conservativism. 64
Summarizing these findings, it is fair to say that the debate over
genetic enhancement could play out in any number of different ways
over time. The clusters of elites in the four cultural quadrants have
yet to establish clear, consistent, and organized positions on the issue.
This means, in turn, that the mass public is not yet receiving a consis-
tent set of cultural cues on which to establish strong policy views.
IlL Deliberation, Cultural Orientation, and Conflict
Given the nature of this conflict, as described in Part II, what are
the prospects for deliberation on reproductive technology policy?
Before answering that question, we again take a step back for a more
fundamental look at the nature of public deliberation and cultural
orientation.
63 See Gastil et al., supra note 13, at 25-27.
64 See supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text.
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A. Defining Deliberation
In the simplest of terms, people deliberate when they carefully
examine a problem and systematically evaluate a sufficient range of
solutions through an open, inclusive exchange that incorporates and
respects diverse points of view.65 At least to a degree, something like
face-to-face deliberation does happen in conversations and public
meetings.66 It is our intention to directly contrast deliberation with
the more heuristic information processing and filtering that are the
norm for both informal interaction, media information processing,
and other political communication.
Research to date on deliberative experiences offers some evi-
dence that it can refine people's policy attitudes, strengthen their in-
formation base, and broaden their repertoire of arguments on an
issue.67 Hoping to produce outcomes like these, civic entrepreneurs
have developed a wide range of deliberative processes designed to
draw everyday citizens into deliberative exchanges in everything from
community forums to official public processes.68 Former Senator and
Democratic presidential candidate John Edwards picked up on these
efforts in October 2007, when he launched his "Democracy One Initi-
ative," which included a proposed "Citizen Congress" that would
blend face-to-face meetings with mass-mediated deliberative
processes.69
Viewed from the perspective of cultural theory, it is less clear
what outcomes might result from an ostensibly deliberative event. If,
on the one hand, one believes it is enough simply to set up the condi-
tions for deliberation, i.e., a free and open discussion of sufficient du-
ration and topical focus, the actual communication and information
processing that takes place might not be so exceptional. Such a dis-
65 Burkhalter et al., supra note 35, at 418.
66 See Michael X. Delli Carpini et al., Public Deliberation, Discursive Participation, and
Citizen Engagement: A Review of the Empirical Literature, 7 ANN. REV. POL. Sci. 315, 323-24
(2004).
67 For a review of empirical literature, see generally id. at 332-37. For a review of deliber-
ative democratic theory, see generally Simone Chambers, Deliberative Democratic Theory, 6
ANN. REV. POL. Sci. 307 (2003).
68 See generally THE DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY HANDBOOK: STRATEGIES FOR EFFEC-
TIVE Civic ENGAGEMENT IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (John Gastil & Peter Levine eds.,
2005) (providing a helpful inventory of such processes).
69 See John Edwards for President, One Democracy Initiative: Returning Washington to
Regular People, http:lljohnedwards.com/issues/govt-reform (last visited July 17, 2008); see also
John Gastil, Government by the People, SEATTLE TIMES, Oct. 17, 2007, http://seattletimes.nw
source.com/html/opinion/2003960790-johngastill9.htm (providing the first author's take on this
proposal).
20081 1789
The George Washington Law Review
cussion might amount to nothing more than another opportunity to
pick up cultural cues from one's fellow discussants; the end result
would be a calcification of the beliefs and policy preferences one held
before the discussion began. Such an outcome has been observed in
research on ostensibly deliberating groups, including both ad hoc dis-
cussion groups of like-minded peers70 and more carefully organized
national policy forums.
71
On the other hand, one might take a more demanding approach
to defining deliberation. Table 2 provides a conception of deliberation
that requires, by definition, particular conversational behaviors and
cognitive processes to take place. 72 If participants do not identify a
range of solutions, weigh pros and cons, listen carefully, respect each
other's different views, and so on, they may have had a discussion but
they have not deliberated. This definition of deliberation is precise in
its elements but sufficiently broad so that it can be extended from
face-to-face discussion to mass-mediated deliberation, in which indi-
vidual media users experience a kind of deliberation through exposure
to and engagement with diverse views in mass media.
This theoretical move no more ensures that deliberation will take
place than does wishful thinking change raindrops into gumdrops.
The point, rather, is to recognize that mere discussion or media use is
not enough if one hopes to bring parties in a cultural dispute to the
point where they can weigh competing claims and perspectives. When
we refer to deliberation in this Article, we will be referring to a de-
manding, rigorous process that can likely never be fully achieved but
might be approached with modest success if sufficient thought goes
into how we design and orchestrate public debates, forums, and even
mass-mediated communication processes.
70 See David Schkade et al., What Happened on Deliberation Day?, 95 CAL. L. REV. 915,
917 (2007).
71 See John Gastil & James P. Dillard, Increasing Political Sophistication Through Public
Deliberation, 16 POL. COMM. 3, 20-21 (1999).
72 This table is adapted from JorN GASTIL, POLITICAL COMMUNICATION AND DELIBERA-
TION 52 (2008).
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Table 2. Definition of Deliberative Discussion and Media Use
Behavior
Feature ofD
Deliberative Ideal Discussant Behavior Media User Behavior
Analytic Process
Al. Create a solid Discuss personal and Seek out opportunities to
information base emotional experiences, as learn of others' experiences
about problem well as known facts. and relevant expert analyses.
A2. Prioritize the Reflect on your own values, Consider the diverse
key values at stake as well as those of others concerns underlying issues
present. and how others prioritize
issues differently.
A3. Identify a Brainstorm a wide variety of Learn about how people
broad range of different ways to address the like or unlike yourself think
solutions problem. about addressing a problem.
A4. Weigh the Recognize the limitations of Reassess your biases toward
pros, cons, and your own preferred solution different solutions by seeing
tradeoffs among and the advantages of how others weigh pros and
solutions others. cons.
A5. Make the best Update your own opinion in Take responsibility for
decision possible light of what you have making up your own mind
learned. No joint decision after listening to the advice
need be reached. of experts, partisans, and
others.
Social Process
S1. Adequately Take turns in conversation Make time to listen to
distribute speaking or ensure a balanced sources with views different
opportunities discussion. from your own. Add your
own voice when appropriate.
S2. Ensure mutual Speak plainly to each other, When you cannot
comprehension and ask for clarification understand an issue or
when confused. argument, seek clarification
from others.
S3. Consider other Listen carefully to what When hearing different
ideas and others say, especially when views, avoid tuning out or
experiences you disagree. ruminating on
counterarguments before
considering what is said.
S4. Respect other Presume that other Give the benefit of the
participants participants are honest and doubt to sources, but
well-intentioned. Respect demand better behavior
unique life experience, from those who violate your
trust.
B. How Cultural Orientations Relate to Deliberative Practices
One more reason that consequential deliberation is more often a
rare accomplishment than the norm is that not all of the cultural ori-
entations are necessarily disposed toward deliberating. Table 3 sum-
marizes the relationship between cultural orientations and
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deliberation. The top half of the table (rows A1-A5) expands on
points made earlier to show how the deployment of cultural orienta-
tions, generally, undermine the analytic process of deliberation. Cul-
tural filtering corrupts information pools, limits the range of
alternatives considered, and biases the weighing of pros and cons.
The only net positive contribution cultural orientations might make is
to infuse the discussions with value considerations, which might help
establish evaluative criteria, e.g., protecting liberty, for assessing pol-
icy solutions. Even then, the strong cultural orientations can impede
the consideration of opposing values, thereby making cross-cultural
deliberation more challenging.
The bottom half of Table 3 (rows S1-$4) shows a more complex
relationship between culture and deliberation with regard to the social
aspect of deliberative practices. Summarizing these social elements,
the hierarch orientation is, by its very conception, skeptical of a mass
deliberative process, given the deliberative role presumably played by
governing elites. By contrast, egalitarians gravitate toward delibera-
tion because they view it as the natural means by which people of
equal status should reach joint decisions. Individualists and collec-
tivists both see virtue and problems in deliberation. The former ap-
preciate the strong voice of the individual, even as dissenter, in
deliberation, but individualists might worry about the pressure for
mutual consideration and comprehension, which could seem beside
the point from their perspective. Collectivists, by contrast, welcome
the emphasis on mutual respect and social consensus, but their orien-
tation privileges maintaining cohesion of expressing diverse
viewpoints.
The sum of these observations is twofold. First, cultural cognition
poses serious obstacles to the analytical processes involved in deliber-
ation. Second, the individuals engaged in a cross-cultural dispute
might have intrinsically different notions about the appropriateness of
public deliberation as a means of resolving policy conflicts. In particu-
lar, egalitarians stand apart from the other cultural orientations in
their theoretical affinity to deliberative politics, and any conflict that
pits egalitarians against others could develop a procedural conflict
over the appropriate means of addressing the public dispute.
The character of this difference should not be overstated. In the
context of the United States, as well as many other countries, it is
likely fair to assume that the overwhelming majority of citizens from
any cultural orientation share a general commitment to democracy as
a means of self-government. Beyond that, it may even be the case
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Ideal Hierarch Egalitarian Individualist Collectivist
Analytic Process
Al. Create a Skeptical of any information that comes from culturally
solid dissonant sources or conflicts with culturally ascribed beliefs
information about the world.
base
A2. Prioritize Culturally affirming values are privileged over all others,
the key values creating cross-cultural value conflicts, but those simply make
at stake for complex deliberation, rather than undermining it.
A3. Identify a Already committed to a culturally predefined set of generic
broad range of solutions to all sociopolitical problems.
solutions
A4. Weigh the Selective application of criteria to favor culturally preferred




A5. Make the Cultural cueing heuristics can compound biased information
best decision gathering and processing.
possible
Social Process
S1. Adequately Believes high- Consistent Belief in equal Only one
distribute status with core opportunity, voice need
speaking contributions value of but often must speak for
opportunities merit more equality, find one's own the whole.
time. opportunities.
S2. Ensure Doubts others' Consistent People must Consistent
mutual ability to grasp with concern fend for with core
comprehension complex issues. for rights of themselves; value of
less- comprehension mutuality.
educated. not ensured.
S3. Consider Believes high- Consistent Consistent with Believes in
other ideas and status with core core value of consistency
experiences contributions value of openness to over
merit more giving each different views, diversity.
consideration. other equal
regard.
S4. Respect Respect must Consistent Consistent with Consistent
other be earned, not with core core value of with core
participants given freely. value of tolerance of value of
mutual differences, community.
respect. I
that they all believe in the value of "public discussion," as defined by
communication theorist Ernest Bormann when he argues that there
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exists a widespread cultural commitment to discussion in Western so-
ciety.73 After all, there is a long history in the U.S. of group discussion
as a model of citizen engagement.
74
Nonetheless, there are many different models of democracy,
75
and though each model is compatible with deliberation, each articu-
lates it and uses it differently. 76 Given the pervasiveness of cultural
orientations in shaping people's beliefs, it is likely that they similarly
shape understandings of democracy, deliberation, and civic responsi-
bility. Thus, hierarchs might favor the elite-competition model of de-
mocracy, whereas egalitarians would align with a more participatory
model. On the other value dimension, Jane Mansbridge's distinction
between adversarial and unitary democracy 77 might describe the dif-
ference between individualists and communitarians, with the former
stressing the appropriateness of partisan conflict and the latter prizing
social consensus over substantive clash.
Once again, the point here is to recognize that the abstract ideal
of deliberation may resonate differently with people from different
cultural orientations. A conflict over reproductive technology, or any
other public dispute, could become layered with a divergence over
democratic procedure on top of substantive disagreement.
IV. Deliberative Opportunities in Reproductive Technology Debates
It is now possible to take these general theoretical ideas back to
the context of the debate over genetic enhancement. That debate ap-
pears to be a nascent cultural conflict, in that the arguments made
thus far appear to cluster into the individualist-egalitarian and hierar-
chical-collectivist quadrants. In a worst-case scenario, this could be
the beginning of a bitter, divisive conflict with poor prospects for
cross-cultural deliberation on the issue. But as our brief review of
contemporary arguments showed, there are pros and cons currently
being voiced on either side of the cultural divide. For a cultural chasm
73 See Ernest G. Bormann, Symbolic Convergence Theory and Communication in Group
Decision Making, in COMMUNICATION AND GROUP DECISION MAKING 81, 99-104 (Randy Y.
Hirokawa & Marshall Scott Poole eds., 2d ed. 1996).
74 See generally WILLIAM M. KEITH, DEMOCRACY AS DISCUSSION: CIvIC EDUCATION AND
THE AMERICAN FORUM MOVEMENT (2007) (giving an overview of discussion educators and the
forum movement).
75 See generally DAVID HELD, MODELS OF DEMOCRACY (1987).
76 JOHN GASTIL, By POPULAR DEMAND: REVITALIZING REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY
THROUGH DELIBERATIVE ELECTIONS 11-13 (2000).
77 See JANE J. MANSBRIDGE, BEYOND ADVERSARY DEMOCRACY iX (Univ. of Chi. Press
1983) (1980).
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to open, both cultural camps would have to first resolve their internal
disagreements, then find themselves on opposite sides of the issue.
Under those circumstances, the most likely policy outcomes would be
either stalemate or, if one side or the other gains sufficient political
power, the establishment of a one-sided policy regime that offends
one or another cultural group while championing its opposite.
But this outcome is only hypothetical. As it stands, with the argu-
ments in both cultural corners split between pros and cons, there may
not emerge a clear cultural clash on the issue. Elites and publics with
culturally opposite values are not necessarily in disagreement over the
appropriateness of genetic enhancement technologies. They will artic-
ulate very different rationales-often even opposing rationales-but
their agreement on policy can help them reach across their more fun-
damental cultural divide.
Even were the split to appear between individualist-egalitarian
and hierarchical-collectivist value clusters, the conflict over genetic
enhancement runs counter to the conventional political divide shown
in Figure 3. Individualists are more likely to side with egalitarians on
this particular issue, and likewise collectivists appear more prepared
to side with hierarchs. This means that there are people in each nas-
cent coalition who have traditionally battled alongside persons on the
other side of this issue. This complicates any in-group/out-group
processes that would normally take place, as each person's primary
group identity (as expressed through conventional party politics, for
instance) is split between the two sides of the genetic enhancement
debate.
This may be a feature of reproductive technology issues gener-
ally. The alignment of egalitarian and individualist values, in opposi-
tion to hierarchical-collectivist counterparts, was suggested in the
theoretical postures of the different cultural orientations in relation to
women's rights, religion, technological innovation, and science. To the
extent that those are key features of public debates over the HPV
vaccine, stem cell research, in vitro fertilization, and other related is-
sues, the same alignment may occur in those cases as well.
A quick glance at the abortion issue suggests that if any of these
were to mature into galvanizing cross-cultural conflicts, they would
likely become political wedge issues, cutting across the traditional left-
right/liberal-conservative/Democratic-Republican divide. Such issues
can have traction at times, but they are often deployed repeatedly to
limited effect. Neither party has a values coalition that fully embraces
either side of such policy debates, though individual candidates and
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politicians find it expedient in particular circumstances to take one
position or another. The historical successes of pro-choice Republi-
cans (in the northeastern U.S.) and pro-life Democrats (in the south-
ern U.S.) testify to how such issues complicate traditional partisan
divides.
Finally, the prospects for deliberation on reproductive technology
issues may be aided by the fact that collectivists are, at least theoreti-
cally, strongly oriented toward desiring a social consensus. This may
mitigate the default distaste that hierarchs have for deliberation, in
that collectivists will seek some kind of cultural accommodation rather
than risk dividing society in the name of social order. On the other
side of the conflict, egalitarians are theoretically inclined to advocate
for participatory approaches emphasizing public deliberation. They
should be able to forge some momentum toward deliberation, in part
by coordination with the collectivists, who are more commonly their
allies not only in promoting deliberation but on substantive policy
questions.
This scenario is ideal for "cultural vouching," something we con-
sider one of the most effective means of overcoming unreflective cul-
tural cueing. Under normal circumstances, one hears a culturally
resonant message from a culturally like-minded messenger. But what
happens when one hears a counter-orientation message from someone
you counted as cultural kin? In a series of experiments, we have be-
gun to explore this question, and we are finding evidence that people
will listen to these individuals who "vouch" for opposing cultural
points of view.7
8
Applying that to the present context, imagine if the individualist-
egalitarians end up solidifying their position in opposition to a unified
hierarch-collectivist cluster on the issue of genetic enhancement, with
one cultural group settling on the pro side and the other on the con.
Even in that case, where both sides reach opposing consensus posi-
tions, it is likely there will remain dissenters who continue to articu-
late doubts among the technology's supporters, or support amidst its
detractors. At that point, those people may come to play the role of
"voucher," sowing doubt within their respective cultural groups and
thereby keeping the debate from breaking out into an all-out cultural
war.
78 See Donald Braman et al., Modeling Facts, Culture, and Cognition in the Gun Debate, 18
SoC. JUST. RES. 283, 285 (2005), available at http://research.yale.edu/culturalcognition/docu-
ments/modeling-cultural-cognition.pdf.
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Conclusion
The preceding theoretical analysis cannot predict what will come
to pass in the genetic enhancement debate, or other reproductive
technology issues. What this does make clear, however, is that a sharp
and protracted cultural divide is far from inevitable on genetic en-
hancement, and probably other issues like it. Those who seek to ad-
vance a policy regime that is respectful of the concerns and needs of
diverse cultural groups should keep in mind the importance of under-
standing the cultural character of their own arguments and the convic-
tions of those with opposing views. It will also be important to
maintain lines of communication across any cultural divides, in part to
keep in contact with cultural vouchers who can reach out to people
who share their values, if not their policy preference.
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